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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










CATHERINE L. BRADICA,  
 
                                    Appellant 
_______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 06-07) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gary L. Lancaster, Chief Judge 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 16, 2010 
_______________ 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 






GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
Appellant Catherine Bradica (“Bradica”) appeals the District Court’s judgment, 
entered on April 27, 2009.  Bradica was charged in a 39 count indictment, with multiple 
 
 2 
counts of fraud and conspiracy.
1
  On February 21, 2008, Bradica pled guilty, without the 
benefit of a plea agreement, to Counts 5-15, 22-27, 28-36, 38, and 39.  The District Court 
granted the Government’s motion to sever the counts to which Bradica pled guilty from 
the remaining counts of the indictment.  The District Court dismissed the remaining 
Counts 1-4, 16-21 and 37 on January 30, 2009. 
The District Court sentenced Bradica to concurrent 41-month terms of 
imprisonment for each of the counts of conviction.  Bradica timely appeals the sentence.  
For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s Judgment. 
I.     BACKGROUND 
We write primarily for the benefit of the parties.  We shall recount only the 
essential facts.  Catherine Bradica (“Bradica”) was employed by Capco Contracting 
(“Capco”), a privately held corporation in McKeesport, Pennsylvania.2  Bradica was the 
Controller, second in charge, and oversaw Capco’s financial, payroll, and accounting 
operations, including the issuance of expense checks. 
The indictment alleged wrongdoing in three different Capco construction projects: 
the PNC Park baseball stadium in Pittsburgh; the Petersen Events Center at the 
University of Pittsburgh; and the reconstruction of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., 
                                                 
1  
Counts 1 through 27 charged mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.  Counts 28 
through 36 charged major fraud against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1031.  Counts 37 and 38 charged conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and Count 
39 charged tax conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
 
2   
Capco entered into subcontracts with prime contractors to perform commercial painting 
and dry walling.   
 
 3 
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (the Pentagon Renovation Program, or 
PENREN).  Capco subcontracted to perform the following tasks: (1) prime, paint, and 
touch-up the steel designated for installation in the baseball stadium; (2) provide 
personnel, equipment, and material to perform touch-up painting on the construction of 
the Peterson Events Center; and (3) provide assistance to AMEC Construction 
Management, Inc.
3
 (“AMEC”) for repairs to the Pentagon.   
Three other individuals were also indicted.
4 
 According to the indictment, Bradica 
and one of the co-defendants, Thomas Cosar, falsified, and directed other Capco 
employees to falsify, the contents of weekly time sheets prepared for work at these three 
construction sites.  From October 16, 2001 through May 17, 2002, Capco (through 
Bradica), submitted 16 requests for payment, with summary invoices, certified payroll 
registers, and vendor invoices for materials purchased.  The invoices reportedly totaled 
approximately $9,921,324.00.
5
    
                                                 
3
  AMEC Construction Management, Inc. is a large-scale construction management 
company based in Bethesda, Maryland. 
 
4
  The other co-defendants were Thomas Cosar, the president and sole stockholder of 
Capco; Daniel Monte, primarily a project manager and painting superintendent for 
Capco; and Joseph Arena, employed as a senior project manager for AMEC, which 
subcontracted with Capco.   
 
5
  This included falsely billed labor hours for people who had not worked at the Pentagon 
and did not receive the payment billed; falsely billed labor hours for Capco employees 
whose services had been diverted on the dates in question to perform work at other 




Bradica admitted her guilt regarding PENREN, but did not admit to involvement 
in the PNC Park or Peterson Events Center projects. 
Utilizing the 2007 Guidelines Manual, the Pre-sentence Investigation Report 
(“PSR”) assigned a base offense level of 6 through application of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and 
the grouping rules of U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.2 and 3D1.4.  The PSR then calculated loss under 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I) as $1,120,666.10.  This resulted in an additional 16 level 
enhancement.
6
  The PSR found that Bradica abused a position of trust and added an 
additional 2 levels, then applied a 2-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, for 
an adjusted total offense level of 22.  Bradica received a criminal history category of I.  
The resulting Guidelines range was 41 to 51 months of imprisonment.  Bradica objected 
to the PSR, particularly the calculation of financial loss resulting from her actions (the 
“loss calculation”).   Not only did Bradica object to the accuracy of the loss calculation, 
but she also asked for a downward departure due to an alleged overstatement of loss.  She 
also requested a variance at sentencing.     
On January 27, 2009, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing, in advance of 
sentencing.   The purpose of the evidentiary hearing was to resolve the amount of loss 
and restitution issues.  Specifically, the parties disputed whether or not Capco received 
payments on all of its invoices.  The Government contended that the amount of loss was 
                                                 
6
  Pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I), the offense level is increased by 16 when the loss exceeds 
$1,000,000 but is less than $2,500,000.  The total offense level of 22 included losses 
related to PENREN, and also included losses related to the PNC Park and the Petersen 
Events Center projects. 
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more than $1 million, and that $807,000 of that amount was attributable to the Pentagon 
project.  Bradica contended that the amount of loss on the Pentagon project was zero. 
Based on information provided to the District Court during the evidentiary 
hearing, the financial loss to AMEC on the Pentagon project was $153,536 and the loss to 
PENREN was approximately $653,624, totaling $807,160.  In addition, Capco over-
billed on the PNC Park project by approximately $283,940.95.  The Peterson Events 
Center at the University of Pittsburgh contracted with Havens Steel Company to erect, 
prepare, and paint the structural steel for the facility.  Havens issued a purchase order to 
Capco, and then Capco fraudulently billed Havens for a total loss of $19,815.43. Capco 
also committed tax fraud, resulting in a total employment tax loss of $29,787.73. 
After the evidentiary hearing, the District Court issued its Tentative Findings and 
Rulings, finding in favor of the Government and supporting the conclusions of the PSR.  
The District Court stated that it found the Government’s proof of loss calculation 
credible, and determined that it would use the calculated amount in determining 
Bradica’s sentence.  The District Court also denied Bradica’s request for a downward 
departure and a downward variance.  Bradica filed a timely appeal.  
II. JURISDICTION 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 




III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A District Court’s sentencing procedure is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Gall 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
7 
  On abuse of discretion review, the Court of 
Appeals gives due deference to the district court’s sentencing decision.  Id. at 52.  
IV.     ANALYSIS 
Bradica has requested both a variance and a downward departure.  She contends 
that the District Court: (1) overstated the seriousness of the offense because of its 
inaccurate loss calculation; (2) committed error by failing to sufficiently consider and 
discuss, on the record, its reasons for rejecting her request for a downward departure; (3) 
committed procedural error by failing to consider one of the § 3553(a) factors; and (4) 
failed to issue a ruling on the downward variance she had requested. 
Bradica contends that the District Court violated this Court’s decision in United 
States v. Lofink, 564 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2009), by denying her request for a downward 
departure in its Tentative Findings and Rulings.  Bradica contends that the denial of her 
request and the alleged Lofink violation warrant reversal. (Appellant’s Br. at 38.) 
                                                 
7
   The Government contends that the standard of review is plain error, because Bradica 
did not object at the sentencing hearing.  See United States v. Lloyd, 469 F.3d 319, 321 
(3d Cir. 2006) (since the appellant did not object to the sentence, we review for plain 
error).  However, we find that Bradica did object.  In fact, Bradica objected at the 
evidentiary hearing before the Court released its Tentative Findings and Rulings (J. App. 
Vol. II 282), and in her sentencing memorandum. (J. App. Vol. III 483.)  In addition, the 
District Court acknowledged that Bradica’s objections were preserved for appellate 






A downward departure occurs when the sentence calculated, after granting a 
departure motion, is less than the bottom of the applicable Guidelines range.  United 
States v. Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 2009). 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005), sentencing Guidelines were no longer deemed mandatory, instead they were 
deemed advisory.  Since Booker, district courts have been provided with a three-step 
process for incorporating adequate consideration of the Guidelines into their sentencing 
procedures: (1) courts must calculate a defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as they 
would have before Booker; (2) they must formally rule on the motions of both parties and 
state on the record whether they are granting a departure and how that departure affects 
the Guidelines calculation, and take into account the court’s pre-Booker case law, which 
continues to have advisory force; and (3) courts are required to exercise their discretion 
by considering the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in setting the sentence they 
impose regardless of whether it varies from the sentence calculated under the Guidelines.  







 A variance is based on the district court’s consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
factors.
9
  If granted, a variance results in a sentence that diverges from the original 
guidelines calculation. 
At step 2 above, the district court decides whether a departure is warranted.  At 
step 3, the district court determines whether a variance, after consideration of the § 
3553(a) factors, is warranted.  In United States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), the first and 
third steps were reinforced, and the Supreme Court clarified that a district court must 
consider all of the § 3553(a) factors.  However, because the issue in Gall addressed a 
                                                 
8
  Bradica requested a downward variance on the same grounds upon which she had 
requested a downward departure, namely, that the loss calculation overstated the 
seriousness of the offense. 
 
9
  The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of 
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) 
the need for the sentence imposed - - (A) to reflect the seriousness of 
the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant: and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational 
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment 
in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for - - 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable 
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines . . . ; (5) any 
pertinent policy statement . . . issued by the Sentencing Commission 
. . . [that] is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; (6) the 
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants 
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; 




variance, the opinion did not address the second step (granting a departure).  In United 
States v. Wise, we stated that district courts must engage in the second step of the 
sentencing process, ruling on departure motions, and when a sentencing court fails to 
expressly rule on the merits of a departure motion, the need to consider all of the § 
3553(a) factors is frustrated.  515 F.3d 207, 216 (3d Cir. 2008). 
Bradica’s Claim Regarding the Loss Calculation 
On February 19, 2008, the Court severed the counts involving PNC Park and the 
Peterson Events Center from the counts involving the Pentagon project (PENREN) and 
later dismissed the PNC Park and Peterson Events Center counts, with prejudice.  Bradica 
argues that since she did not plead guilty to the counts corresponding to two of the three 
projects, the loss from those projects should not be considered.  The District Court did 
not consider the loss for the PNC Park or Petersen Events Center projects for purposes of 
the Tentative Findings and Rulings.  (J. App. Vol. I 4 note 5.) 
The PSR contained a calculated amount of loss of $807,161, in connection with 
the reconstruction of the Pentagon.  Bradica claimed that the amount of loss, as calculated 
in the PSR, overstates the seriousness of her conduct and thus warranted both a 
downward departure and a downward variance.    
 To address this contention, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing, allowing 
both defendant and the Government to present evidence.  The District Court then issued 
Tentative Findings and Rulings.  Principally, the Court found that the Government’s 
witnesses were credible, and that the Government met its burden of showing that Bradica 
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caused a loss of $807,161, in connection with the reconstruction of the Pentagon.  
Therefore, Bradica’s claim that the loss calculation overstated the seriousness of her 
conduct is not valid.  The loss ascribed to the Pentagon was attributable, based on the 
evidence, to Bradica. 
Bradica’s Request for a Downward Departure 
Bradica next contends that the District Court failed to address her motion for a 
downward departure.  However, in its Tentative Findings and Rulings, the District Court 
stated: “We also disagree with defendants that the amount of loss substantially overstates 
the seriousness of defendants’ conduct and warrants a downward departure . . .” (J. App. 
Vol. I 8 n.6), thereby effectively denying the motion for downward departure.  In her 
sentencing memorandum, submitted after the Tentative Findings and Rulings, Bradica 
again requested a downward departure, along with a downward variance. 
In the instant case, we find that the District Court did rule on Bradica’s departure 
motion, in its April 2, 2009, Tentative Findings and Rulings.  At the sentencing hearing, 
the District Judge discussed the Guidelines range and explained how it was calculated.  
Next, the District Judge discussed the § 3553 (a) factors in detail, as described in Step 3.  
We find no discussion of Step 2 regarding the downward departure motion.  Although we 
have not required district courts to use the terms, “departure” or “variance,” we have 
noted that the use of these terms assists our review.  Lofink, 564 F.3d at 239 (quoting 
United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 837 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
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Although Bradica contends that this case conflicts with our holding in Lofink, we 
find the facts of the two cases distinct.  In Bradica’s case, we have been provided with 
enough information to determine how the District Court arrived at its sentence.  The 
District Court considered the applicable Guidelines range at the time of sentencing, and 
took all of the § 3553(a) factors into consideration.  However, in Lofink, we were unable 
to determine whether the Court denied the appellant’s motion because it concluded there 
was no basis to grant the motion under §5K2.13 or because the Court exercised its 
discretion in not granting the motion.  See Lofink, 564 F.3d at 240.  We observed that 
even though the district court decided that some aspect of the case warranted a sentence 
below the original guidelines range, the court never concluded that no reduction was 
warranted.  Id.   
In Bradica, the District Court stated that “I have heard and considered the evidence 
and arguments, and I believe that the commission [sic] of the guidelines has determined 
the recommended sentence that is proper in this type of case even though the Guidelines 
are not mandatory but merely a recommendation.”  (J. App. Vol. III 535.) 
The District Court in Bradica’s case stated that “this sentence will adequately 
address the sentencing goals of punishment, rehabilitation and deterrence.”  Id.  
Therefore, although Bradica hinges her argument regarding her entitlement to a 
downward departure on what she considers to be the overstated loss calculation, the 
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District Court had already stated that it disagreed with Bradica’s contention that the loss 
calculation was over calculated.
10
   
We hold that the District Court considered Bradica’s request for a downward 
departure and after a thorough evaluation of the facts, exercised its discretion in deciding 
that the evidence presented by Bradica did not warrant a downward departure.  As we 
have stated, we have no authority to review discretionary denials of departure motions in 
calculating sentencing ranges.  Jackson, 467 F.3d at 839.   
Bradica’s Request for a Downward Variance and Consideration of the § 3553(a) Factors 
Bradica also contends that the District Court committed procedural error by failing 
to rule explicitly on her request for a downward variance and also by failing to consider, 
under § 3553(a)(1), the nature and circumstances of the offense.  Bradica argues that both 
the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have stated that the failure to address a 
requested basis for variance is reversible error.  As such, her sentence must be vacated 
and the case remanded for resentencing.
11
  We disagree. 
We have stated that we are guided by the requirement that sentencing courts must 
give meaningful consideration to all of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  See United 
States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530, 546 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Cooper, 437 
                                                 
10
  The District Court conducted a thorough analysis of the loss calculations and stated 
that it “disagreed with defendants that the amount of loss substantially overstates the 
seriousness of defendant’s conduct . . .” (Appellee’s Br. at 23.)   
 
11
  Bradica cites no case law in support of her argument that her sentence must be vacated 
and the case remanded. 
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F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 
2007) (holding that the touchstone of reasonableness is whether the record as a whole 
reflects rational and meaningful consideration of those factors.)  A district court’s “failure 
to consider the § 3553(a) factors” can create a procedurally unreasonable sentence.  
United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).   
During the sentencing hearing, the District Court discussed the § 3553(a) factors 
in detail.  Indeed, the District Judge stated that he took “all relevant factors into account, 
especially the loss sustained and the requirement of restitution . . .” (J. App. Vol. III 521-
25.)  Although Bradica contends that the District Court failed to address the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, we find this statement to be untrue.   
The District Court thoroughly discussed the nature and circumstances of the 
offense, stating that: “(1) the offense was not violent in nature, but involved a scheme to 
defraud the government and private construction companies and trade unions; (2) the 
offense was ongoing in nature, as the fraudulent activities began in 2000 and continued 
for two years; (3) the offenses were related to a larger pattern of criminal activity, 
including elaborate schemes by defendant for false billing on contracts related to 
reconstruction of the Pentagon after September 11, 2001, and (4) the victims of the 
offense include the U.S. Department of Defense and AMEC Corporation, Dick 
Corporation, Barton Malow Company, International Union of Painters and Allied Trade 
District Council 57, and Havens Steel.”  (J. App. Vol. III 521-23.)   
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We find that the District Court’s analysis of the §3553(a) factors made it clear that 
the District Judge listened and considered each of Bradica’s arguments; particularly, the 
one she alleges was not discussed, the nature and circumstances of the offense.  The 
record reflects the District Court’s consideration of each of the § 3553(a) factors in its 
decision not to grant a downward variance.  Therefore, the District Court did not commit 
procedural error, and the decision to deny Bradica’s motion for a downward variance was 
procedurally reasonable.   
As the Supreme Court held in Gall, a district court must consider all of the § 
3553(a) factors.  In keeping with that directive, the District Judge here correctly 
calculated the applicable Guidelines range and allowed both parties to present arguments 
as to what they believed the appropriate sentence should be.  More important, the District 
Court considered all of the § 3553(a) factors, and documented his analysis of each factor.  
(See J. App. Vol. III 521-25.)    
 Since we find that the sentence was not procedurally unreasonable, the only 
question for us to resolve is whether the District Court abused its discretion in 
determining that the § 3553(a) factors supported a sentence at the bottom of, rather than 
below, the guidelines range.   The District Court did not commit a procedural error; 
calculated the appropriate U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range; did not treat the Guidelines 
as mandatory;  considered all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; and selected a sentence 
based on appropriate facts in the record.  In addition, the District Court adequately 
explained the sentence.  Id.  Because the District Court did not deviate from the 
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guidelines range, no explanation for any deviation is required.  Given the sentence’s 
procedural reasonableness, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the 




IV.    CONCLUSION 
We find that the District Court addressed Bradica’s request for a downward 
departure.  Also, we find that the District Court’s refusal to grant the motion for a 
downward departure did not transgress our holding in Lofink, and did not constitute 
either abuse of discretion or procedural error.  Further, we find that the District Court 
thoroughly discussed the § 3553(a) factors in denying Bradica’s motion for a downward 
variance.   The sentence is procedurally reasonable.  Reversal is not warranted in this 
case.   
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
